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Abstract. We consider the following question: in a nonatomic routing game, can the tolls that induce
the minimum latency flow be computed without knowing the latency functions? Since the latency functions
are unknown, we assume we are given an oracle that has access to the underlying routing game. A query
to the oracle consists of tolls on edges, and the response is the resulting equilibrium flow. We show that in
this model, it is impossible to obtain optimal tolls. However, if we augment the oracle so that it returns the
total latency of the equilibrium flow induced by the tolls in addition to the flow itself, then the required tolls
can be computed with a polynomial number of queries.
1 Introduction and Preliminaries
Let Γ = (G = (V,E), l,K = (di, si, ti)i∈[k]) be a multicommodity nonatomic routing game on a
directed graph G = (V,E), where l = (le)e∈E are the latency functions on the edges, and there are
k commodities. Commodity i has source si, sink ti, and total demand di. As is standard, m := |E|
and n := |V |.
A multicommodity flow f = (f i)i∈[k] is feasible if each flow f
i is an si-ti flow of value di. A
feasible flow f is a Wardrop equilibrium (or simply an equilibrium) if for every commodity i and all
si-ti paths P , Q with f
i
e > 0 on every edge e ∈ P ,∑
e∈P
le(fe) ≤
∑
e∈Q
le(fe) .
For latency functions l in game Γ , we use eqf(l) to denote the equilibrium flow. For any flow f ,
we define cost(f, l) =
∑
e∈E fele(fe) as the total latency of flow f . The optimal flow for a game is
the feasible flow that minimizes the total latency.
Let τ = (τe)e∈E ∈ R
m
+ be a vector of non-negative tolls on edges. Then a feasible flow f is a
Wardrop equilibrium (or simply an equilibrium) with tolls τ if for every commodity i and all si-ti
paths P , Q with f ie > 0 on every edge e ∈ P ,
∑
e∈P
le(fe) + τe ≤
∑
e∈Q
le(fe) + τe .
We use eqf(l, τ) to denote the equilibrium flow with tolls τ on the edges, and say that tolls τ induce
the flow eqf(l, τ).
We study a query model introduced in [1], as well as its extension, for routing games. In this
model, there is a routing game Γ , the latency functions l∗e of which are unknown. Instead, we are
given oracle access to the routing game. Each query to the oracle consists of tolls τ = (τe)e∈E
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on the edges, and the response is the equilibrium flow eqf(l∗, τ). For our results, we restrict the
latency functions to standard degree-r polynomials as defined in [1]. Then I, U and K are defined
accordingly. In particular, I is the input size of the routing game, logU = poly(I), and K :=
K(r) = poly(U,
∑
i di).
Results similar to those in Section 2.2 were also independently obtained by Roth et al. [3].
2 Computing Optimal Tolls
2.1 Optimal tolls from observations of equilibrium flow
We first show that if in response to a query the oracle returns only the flow at equilibrium, then
it is impossible to obtain the optimal tolls. For this, we construct two single-commodity routing
games Γ 1 and Γ 2 with demand d = 1 (Figure 1) on parallel edges with latency functions l1 and l2
respectively that have the same equilibrium flow for any tolls, and hence cannot be distinguished
in the query model.1 However, the optimal flows and optimal tolls are different for the two routing
games.
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Figure 1: Latency functions l1 and l2 have the same equilibrium flow for any edge tolls. Demand
d = 1 in the example.
It can be easily verified that for any tolls τ , eqf(l1, τ) = eqf(l2, τ). However, for l1, the equilibrium
flow is the optimal flow, while for l2, the optimal flow is (1/2, 1/2).
2.2 Optimal tolls from observations of equilibrium flow and total latency
Given the previous impossibility result, an obvious question is whether the optimal tolls can be
obtained with limited additional information from the oracle in response to a query. We now show
that if in response to a query, the oracle returns the flow at equilibrium as well as the total latency
at equilibrium, the optimal tolls can in fact be obtained with a polynomial number of queries.
The starting point for our result is the observation that the total latency is a strictly convex
function of the flows. By this observation, if we could obtain the total latency and its gradient for
any flow, then standard gradient-descent algorithms would suffice to obtain the minimum-latency
flow. By the ellipsoid-based algorithm in [1], given any acyclic target flow, we can obtain the tolls
required to enforce the flow with a polynomial number of queries. Since we assume we additionally
obtain from the oracle the total latency of the equilibrium flow, the first of the requirements can
be satisfied: for any flow, we can obtain the tolls required to enforce it, as well as its total latency.
Additionally, if we are given the optimal flow, we can obtain the tolls required to enforce it as well.
Theorem 1 ([1]). Let f∗ be a target acyclic multicommodity flow and δ > 0. Let ǫ = δ
2
Kmk
∑
i
di
.
Then, in time poly
(
I, log(1
δ
)
)
and using poly
(
I, log(1
δ
)
)
ǫ-oracle queries, we can compute tolls τ
such that ‖f(l∗, τ)− f∗‖∞ ≤ 2δ or determine that no such tolls exist.
It follows from the theorem that for any δ > 0, we can obtain in a polynomial number of queries
tolls τ so that ‖f(l∗, τ) − f∗‖∞ ≤ δ/(2mK
2), and hence cost(f(l∗, τ), l∗)− cost(f∗, l∗) ≤ δ.
In order to obtain the optimal tolls, instead of trying to obtain the gradient, we utilize the zero-
order convex programming techniques of [2, Chapter 9], based on the ellipsoid algorithm. These
1This is the query model in [1], and shows that in this model it is necessary to be given a particular target flow.
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algorithms return an approximate minimizer of the convex function, but require only a zero-order
oracle for minimizing a convex function: an oracle which returns only the value of the function at
the given point. We present the results from [2, Chapter 9] for opimization using a zero-order oracle,
and then describe its use in our algorithm.
Optimization with a zero-order oracle. We modify (and somewhat simplify) the notation
from [2] in order to avoid conflicts with notation already used. Let C be a convex, closed, bounded
body in RN . We require that there exist ellipsoids W¯ 0 and W 0 so that W¯ 0 ⊃ C ⊃ W 0 and
|W¯ 0| ≤ NN |W 0|. This can be enforced by standard techniques (see [2, Chapter 4]). Let f0(x),
. . ., fM (x) be convex and continuous functions defined on C. We also have a zero-order δ-oracle
ψ = (ψ0, . . . , ψM ) so that for x ∈ C, |ψj(x)− fj(x)| ≤ δ for j = 0, . . . ,M . The class of problems
min
x∈C
f0(x) | fj(x) ≤ 0, j ∈ [M ]
is denoted Cδ(C,RN ,M). Define
rj(f) :=
{
supC f0 − infC f0 if j = 0,
max{0, supC fi} if j ∈ [M ] .
Further, for ǫ > 0 define
ν(f, ǫ) := min
j
ǫ
rj(f)
.
Theorem 2 ([2]). There exists a polynomial P (N) so that if ǫ ≥ P (N)δ then any problem from the
class Cδ(C,RN ,M) can be solved to within absolute error 2ǫ in time O
(
N7 lnN ln
4N2
ν(f, ǫ)
)
.
For our algorithm, we define C to be the set of feasible multicommodity flows. Then N = mk,
M = 0. Define f0(f) to be the total latency of flow f . By definition of K, r0(f) ≤ mK(
∑
i di)
2. Let
ǫ > 0 and let f∗ be the minimum latency flow. Theorem 2 gives the following result in this case.
Proposition 1. A feasible flow fˆ that satisfies cost(fˆ , l∗) − cost(f∗, l∗) ≤ ǫ can be obtained with
O
(
N7 logN log(NK
∑
i di/ǫ)
)
queries to a zero-order δ-oracle that returns the total latency of the
flow.
The algorithm for obtaining the optimal tolls then follows by combining the algorithm for Propo-
sition 1 with the oracle obtained from Theorem 1.
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